So, what does Russia want?
Well, what are they doing? What do they say they want?
OK, interesting. Russia is doing none of that. Literally none, and stopping Turkey encroaching on Ayn Issa is probably simply an act of will—it sure as shit is with the US—so it’s not like they’re even trying. Good talk.
Let’s recall this Tweet for a moment.
So, as per the previous posts, the war seems to have stalled—although that means maintaining the previous status quo, which is really bad for people who are in a steady state of being bombed, or having their homes “cleansed” of them and so forth. Stalled, it seems, for the geopolitical maneuvers to work out.
So basically, Turkey is trying to maintain or increase its independence to do what it wants to do, the possible constraints being NATO, coalition (US), and Russia.
Which is why the S-400 missile air defense system that, to recall, Turkey got kicked out of the F-35 program for buying from Russia due to their possession of it being incompatible with existing systems, or something like that.
Obviously an attempt at a show of force and independence from the US and, by extension, NATO.
The US, predictably, doesn’t like it.
And then, of course, either the coalition or Russia hit some TFSA hard in the north after the first test, and Russia and SAA appear to be routing the opposition in the west. It’s early, but whatever Erdogan thought it would accomplish, it appears that Turkey’s attempt at flexing has not had the desired outcomes.
Which brings us to the issue of what Russia wants to the forefront, as it has to do with the relationships between her would be client states.
Russia still wants the SDF to join the Syrian army.
Seems that that’s what Russia has really always wanted, as then the SDF as an independent force is dissolved and Erdogan has less leverage for its intervention and Assad can reconsolidate territorial Syria under Russian
strings influence—and then Iran has to go through Russia as well.
Russian pressure for the consolidation seems to be increasing. Russia’s leverage here, of course, came when the SDF had to cut a deal with Russia and Assad after the US announced its withdrawal. At the time, as they stated explicitly and publicly, Russia was their only option. Notably, that may no longer be the case, depending on what the US is doing of course.
Russia has been the hardest nut to crack of all in all this, but it really looks like Russia is… offering Turkey a choice between Russia and NATO?
Maybe not explicitly or legally or formally, but this is definitely a sphere of influence kind of thing and Russia is trying to pull Turkey into their sphere, have them use their weapons, lean on them for support, etc.
I’m about 92% sure I know who NATO would like Turkey to choose at this point and would be happy to help pack their bags—cause Lord knows they don’t have the wherewithal to kick Turkey out of their house.
The very idea of this kind of choice is, of course, is very strange, historically speaking: It counters the historical trend of countries wanting to join NATO.
Countries like, for example, Turkey. Go figure.
But Russia definitely wants the influence. Of course, the US is the wildcard that can muck up Russia’s machinations. A substantial chunk of Russia’s leverage came from the SDF having to cut a deal with them and, by extension, Assad. So the US’s announced re-engagment of the engagement that they never actually disengaged from during the cease fire than never happened following the withdrawal that was never really undertaken… should complicate Russia’s position.
So good thing we have PBS by our side to amplify Russia’s concern trolling of the the Kurds.
PBS: Russia warns Syrian Kurds against relying on U.S. support
MOSCOW (AP) — Russia’s foreign minister is warning Syria’s Kurds that relying on U.S. support “won’t bring them any good.”
Sergey Lavrov on Tuesday accused Syria’s Kurds of failing to abide by a Russia-Turkey deal that halted a Turkish offensive into Syria.
He says the Kurds are trying to stay allied with the U.S., and avoid engaging in dialogue with the Syrian government.
Et tu, PBS?
There’s almost no content in that article. Just more mouth-piecing for state actors whose truths are at best orthogonal to reality. As always, what they say might be true, but it’s always what they want you to hear to accomplish their own goals. That’s not cynicism, it’s the theory of real politick.
Why the media thinks the states are not loud enough on their own without amplification eludes me.
If anything, Russia sounds concerned; Russia’s plans were predicated on a certain set of arrangements that may be in jeopardy with the US’s new announcement that they are instituting the same mission they’ve always had now that… whatever.
Like, why do you even bring up your partner’s ex unless something’s bugging you, yeah? Russia sounds worried to me.
And, I mean, we’ve already seen evidence that respect for the US military remains very, very high. To the point that, as we’ve seen, it’s funny—on multiple levels.
“Please don’t go. You promised!”
Honestly, Russia doesn’t usually act this lame.
And yeah, maybe Russia should be worried? The US, claiming to have never really been absent, are behaving as though they are back in terms of their announcements, specifically with respect to conducting operations with and that benefit the SDF and affiliated types.
Opening the south eastern border crossing signals both the intention of staying, and supporting the socio-economic situation in that region.
Getcha’ popcorn ready.
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